Lewis Mere Christianity Touchstone:New York, pp. Thomas Aquinas: God and Explanations. An Objection: Free Will and Natural Evil At this point, someone might raise the following objection. Having trouble coming up with an Essay Title? O'Leary Duncan, H.
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The existence of evil and suffering in our world seems to pose a serious challenge to belief in the existence problem of evil essay a perfect God, problem of evil essay. If God were all-knowing, it seems that God would know about all of the horrible things that problem of evil essay in our world. If God were all-powerful, God would be able to do something about all of the evil and suffering. Furthermore, if God were problem of evil essay perfect, then surely God would want to do something about it.
And yet we find that our world is filled with countless instances of evil and suffering. These facts about evil and suffering seem to conflict with the orthodox theist claim that there exists a perfectly good God. The challenged posed by this apparent conflict has come to be known as the problem of evil. This article addresses one form of that problem that is prominent in recent philosophical discussions—that the conflict that exists between the claims of orthodox theism and the facts about evil and suffering in our world is a logical one. The article clarifies the nature of the logical problem of evil and considers various theistic responses to the problem.
Special attention is given to the free will defense, which has been the most widely discussed theistic response to the logical problem of evil. Journalist and best-selling author Lee Strobel commissioned George Barna, the public-opinion pollster, to conduct a nationwide survey. If God is all-powerful, problem of evil essay, all-knowing and perfectly good, why does he let so many bad things happen? It would be one thing if the only people who suffered debilitating diseases or tragic losses were the likes of Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin or Osama Bin Laden. As it is, however, thousands of good-hearted, innocent people experience the ravages of violent crime, terminal disease, and other evils.
Michael Petersonp. Something problem of evil essay dreadfully wrong with our world. An earthquake kills hundreds in Peru. A pancreatic cancer patient suffers prolonged, excruciating pain and dies. A pit bull attacks a two-year-old child, angrily ripping his flesh and killing him. Countless multitudes suffer the ravages of war in Somalia. A crazed cult leader pushes eighty-five people to their deaths in Waco, Texas. Millions starve and die in North Korea as famine ravages the land. Horrible things of all kinds happen in our world—and that has been the story since the dawn of civilization.
Petersonp. They claim that, since there is something morally problematic about a morally perfect God allowing all of the evil and suffering we see, there must not be a morally perfect God after all. The popularity of this kind of argument has led Hans Küngp. In the second half of the twentieth century, atheologians that is, persons who try to prove the non-existence of God commonly claimed that the problem of evil was a problem of logical inconsistency. Mackiep. Here it can be shown, not that religious beliefs lack rational support, but that they are positively irrational, that several parts of the essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another. Evil is a problem, for the theist, in that a contradiction is involved in the fact of evil on the one hand and belief in the omnipotence and omniscience of God on the other.
Mackie and McCloskey can be understood as claiming that it is impossible for all of the following statements to be true at the same time:. Any two or three of them might be true at the same time; but there is no way that all of them could be true. In other words, 1 through 4 form a logically inconsistent set. What does it mean to say that something is logically inconsistent? None of the statements in 1 through 4 directly contradicts any other, so if the set is logically inconsistent, it must be because we can deduce a contradiction from it. This is precisely what atheologians claim to be able to do. Atheologians claim that a contradiction can easily be deduced from 1 through 4 once we think through the implications of the divine attributes cited in 1 through 3. They reason as follows:.
Statements 6 through 8 jointly imply that if the perfect God of theism really existed, there would not be any evil or suffering. However, as we all know, our world is filled with a staggering amount of evil and suffering, problem of evil essay. Atheologians claim that, if we reflect upon 6 through 8 in light of the fact of evil and suffering in our world, we should be led to the following conclusions:. Putting the point more bluntly, this line of argument suggests that—in light of the evil and suffering we find in our world—if God exists, he is either impotent, ignorant or wicked. It should be obvious that 13 conflicts with 1 through 3 above. To make the conflict more clear, we can combine 1problem of evil essay, 2 and 3 into the following single statement.
There is no way that 13 and 14 could both be true at the same time. These statements are logically inconsistent or contradictory. Statement 14 is simply the conjunction of 1 through 3 and expresses the central belief of classical theism. However, problem of evil essay, atheologians claim that statement 13 can also be derived from 1 through 3. Because a contradiction can be deduced from statements 1 through 4 and because all theists believe 1 through 4atheologians claim that theists have logically inconsistent beliefs. They note that philosophers have always believed it is never rational to believe something contradictory.
Problem of evil essay the believer in God escape from this dilemma? In his best-selling book When Bad Things Happen to Good PeopleRabbi Harold Kushner offers the following escape route for the theist: deny the truth of 1. As a perfectly good God, he also feels your pain. Denying the truth of either 123 or 4 is certainly one way for the theist to escape from the logical problem of evil, but it would not be a very palatable option to many problem of evil essay. In the remainder of this essay, we will examine some theistic responses to the logical problem of evil that do not require the abandonment of any central tenet problem of evil essay theism.
Theists who want to rebut the logical problem of evil need to find a way to show that 1 through 4 —perhaps despite initial appearances—are consistent after all. We said above that a set of statements is logically inconsistent if and only if that set includes a direct contradiction or a direct contradiction can be deduced from that set. That means that a set of statements is logically consistent if and only if that set does not include a direct contradiction and a direct contradiction cannot be deduced from that set. In other words. Notice that 15 does not say that consistent statements must actually be true at the same time. They may all be false or some may be true and others false. Consistency only requires that it be possible for all of the statements to be true even if that possibility is never actualized.
It does not require the joint of a consistent set of statements to be plausible. It may be exceedingly unlikely or improbable that a certain set of statements should all be true at the same time. But improbability is not the same thing as impossibility. As long as there is nothing contradictory about their conjunction, it will be possible even if unlikely for them all to be true at the same time. This brief discussion allows us to see that the atheological claim that statements 1 through 4 are logically inconsistent is a rather strong one. How might a theist go about demonstrating that 16 is false?
Some theists suggest that perhaps God has a good reason for allowing the evil and suffering that he does. Mass murderers and serial killers typically have reasons for why they commit horrible crimes, but they do not have good reasons. If God were to have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil, would it be possible for God to be omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and yet for there to be evil and suffering? The most that can be concluded is that either God does not exist or God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. So, some theists suggest that the real question behind the logical problem of evil is whether 17 is true. If it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil and suffering to occur, then the logical problem of evil fails to prove the non-existence of God, problem of evil essay.
If, however, it is not possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil, problem of evil essay, then it seems that 13 would be true: God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good. An implicit assumption behind this part of the debate over the logical problem of evil is the following:. Is 18 correct? Many philosophers think so. It is problem of evil essay to see how a God who allowed bad things to happen just for the heck of it could be worthy of reverence, faith and worship. I just felt like letting it problem of evil essay. What would it look like for God to have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil?
Suppose a gossipy neighbor were to tell you that Mrs. Jones just allowed someone to inflict unwanted pain upon her child. Your first reaction to this news might be one of horror. But once you find out that the pain was caused by a shot that immunized Mrs. Jones as a danger to society. Generally, we believe the following moral principle to be true. In the immunization case, Mrs. Jones has a morally sufficient reason for overriding or suspending this principle. A higher problem of evil essay duty—namely, the duty of protecting the long-term health of her child—trumps the lesser duty expressed by If God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil and suffering, theists claim, it will probably look something like Mrs.
Alvin Plantingahas offered the most famous contemporary philosophical response to this question. He suggests the following as a possible morally sufficient reason:. God could not eliminate much of the evil and suffering in this world without thereby eliminating the greater good of having created persons with free will with whom he could have relationships and who are able to love one another and do good deeds, problem of evil essay. MSR1 claims that God allows some evils to occur that are smaller in value than a greater good to which they are intimately connected. If God eliminated the evil, he would have to eliminate the greater good as well. God is pictured as being in a situation much like that of Mrs. Jones: she allowed a small evil the pain of a needle to be inflicted upon her child because that pain was necessary for bringing about a greater good problem of evil essay against polio.
Before we try to decide whether MSR1 can justify God in allowing evil and suffering to occur, some of its key terms need to be explained.
rationale essay
The sin of Adam and Eve was a moral evil. MSR2 represents a common Jewish and Christian response to the challenge posed by natural evil. The emotional pain of separation, shame and broken relationships are also consequences that first instance of moral evil. In the description of the sixth day of creation God says to Adam and Eve,. I give you every seed-bearing plant on the face of the whole earth and every tree that has fruit with seed in it. They will be yours for food. And to all the beasts of the earth and all the birds of the air and all the creatures that move on the ground—everything that has the breath of life in it—I give every green plant for food.
In other words, the Garden of Eden is pictured as a peaceful, vegetarian commune until moral evil entered the world and brought natural evil with it. It seems, then, that the Free Will Defense might be adapted to rebut the logical problem of natural evil after all. Some might think that MSR2 is simply too far-fetched to be taken seriously. Moreover, MSR2 would have us believe that there were real persons named Adam and Eve and that they actually performed the misdeeds attributed to them in the book of Genesis. MSR2 seems to be asking us to believe things that only a certain kind of theist would believe.
The implausibility of MSR2 is taken by some to be a serious defect. Does it succeed in solving the logical problem of evil as it pertains to either moral or natural evil? Recall that the logical problem of evil can be summarized as the following claim:. what is the least that you would have to prove in order to show that 40 is false? If you could point to an actual instance of the type of situation in question, that would certainly prove that 40 is false. All you need is a possible x. The claim. is the contradictory of The two claims are logical opposites. If one is true, the other is false; if one is false, the other is true.
If you can show that x is merely possible, you will have refuted How would you go about finding a logically possible x? Philosophers claim that you only need to use your imagination. In a word, conceivability is your guide to possibility. Since the logical problem of evil claims that it is logically impossible for God and evil to co-exist, all that Plantinga or any other theist needs to do to combat this claim is to describe a possible situation in which God and evil co-exist. All he needs to do is give a logically consistent description of a way that God and evil can co-exist. Plantinga claims God and evil could co-exist if God had a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. All that Plantinga needs to claim on behalf of MSR1 and MSR2 is that they are logically possible that is, not contradictory.
It certainly seems so. In fact, it appears that even the most hardened atheist must admit that MSR1 and MSR2 are possible reasons God might have for allowing moral and natural evil. However, since MSR2 deals with the logical problem of evil as it pertains to natural evil which claims that it is logically impossible for God and natural evil to co-exist , it only needs to sketch a possible way for God and natural evil to co-exist. The fact that MSR2 may be implausible does not keep it from being possible. Since the situation described by MSR2 is clearly possible, it appears that it successfully rebuts the logical problem of evil as it pertains to natural evil.
Since MSR1 and MSR2 together seem to show contra the claims of the logical problem of evil how it is possible for God and moral and natural evil to co-exist, it seems that the Free Will Defense successfully defeats the logical problem of evil. His solution to the logical problem of evil leaves them feeling unsatisfied and suspicious that they have been taken in by some kind of sleight of hand. For example, J. Since this defense is formally [that is, logically] possible, and its principle involves no real abandonment of our ordinary view of the opposition between good and evil, we can concede that the problem of evil does not, after all, show that the central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another.
But whether this offers a real solution of the problem is another question. He expresses doubt about whether Plantinga has adequately dealt with the problem of evil. It was, after all, Mackie himself who characterized the problem of evil as one of logical inconsistency:. In response to this formulation of the problem of evil, Plantinga showed that this charge of inconsistency was mistaken. Even Mackie admits that Plantinga solved the problem of evil, if that problem is understood as one of inconsistency. As an attempt to rebut the logical problem of evil, it is strikingly successful. As an all-around response to the problem of evil, the Free Will Defense does not offer us much in the way of explanation.
It leaves several of the most important questions about God and evil unanswered. The desire to see a theistic response to the problem of evil go beyond merely undermining a particular atheological argument is understandable. If there is any blame that needs to go around, it may be that some of it should go to Mackie and other atheologians for claiming that the problem of evil was a problem of inconsistency. The ease with which Plantinga undermined that formulation of the problem suggests that the logical formulation did not adequately capture the difficult and perplexing issue concerning God and evil that has been so hotly debated by philosophers and theologians. In fact, this is precisely the message that many philosophers took away from the debate between Plantinga and the defenders of the logical problem of evil.
They reasoned that there must be more to the problem of evil than what is captured in the logical formulation of the problem. It is now widely agreed that this intuition is correct. Responding to this formulation of the problem requires much more than simply describing a logically possible scenario in which God and evil co-exist. It has not, however, been the only such response. Hick rejects the traditional view of the Fall, which pictures humans as being created in a finitely perfect and finished state from which they disastrously fell away. Instead, Hick claims that human beings are unfinished and in the midst of being made all that God intended them to be.
A world full of suffering, trials and temptations is more conducive to the process of soul-making than a world full of constant pleasure and the complete absence of pain. Hick , pp. The value-judgment that is implicitly being invoked here is that one who has attained to goodness by meeting and eventually mastering temptations, and thus by rightly making responsible choices in concrete situations, is good in a richer and more valuable sense than would be one created ab initio in a state either of innocence or of virtue…. I suggest, then, that it is an ethically reasonable judgment… that human goodness slowly built up through personal histories of moral effort has a value in the eyes of the Creator which justifies even the long travail of the soul-making process.
Eleonore Stump offers another response to the problem of evil that brings a range of distinctively Christian theological commitments to bear on the issue. She writes,. It tends to humble him, show him his frailty, make him reflect on the transience of temporal goods, and turn his affections towards other-worldly things, away from the things of this world. No amount of moral or natural evil, of course, can guarantee that a man will [place his faith in God]…. But evil of this sort is the best hope, I think, and maybe the only effective means, for bringing men to such a state.
Stump , p. Stump claims that, although the sin of Adam—and not any act of God—first brought moral and natural evil into this world, God providentially uses both kinds of evil in order to bring about the greatest good that a fallen, sinful human being can experience: a repaired will and eternal union with God. The responses of both Hick and Stump are intended to cover not only the logical problem of evil but also any other formulation of the problem as well. Regardless of the details of these alternatives, the fact remains that all they need to do in order to rebut the logical problem of evil is to describe a logically possible way that God and evil can co-exist.
A variety of morally sufficient reasons can be proposed as possible explanations of why a perfect God might allow evil and suffering to exist. Because the suggestions of Hick and Stump are clearly logically possible, they, too, succeed in undermining the logical problem of evil. One point of conflict concerns the possibility of human free will in heaven. Plantinga claims that if someone is incapable of doing evil, that person cannot have morally significant free will. He also maintains that part of what makes us the creatures we are is that we possess morally significant freedom. If that freedom were to be taken away, we might very well cease to be the creatures we are. However, consider the sort of freedom enjoyed by the redeemed in heaven. According to classical theism, believers in heaven will somehow be changed so that they will no longer commit any sins.
It is not that they will contingently always do what is right and contingently always avoid what is wrong. They will somehow no longer be capable of doing wrong. In other words, their good behavior will be necessary rather than contingent. i If heavenly dwellers do not possess morally significant free will and yet their existence is something of tremendous value, it is not clear that God was justified in creating persons here on Earth with the capacity for rape, murder, torture, sexual molestation, and nuclear war. It seems that God could have actualized whatever greater goods are made possible by the existence of persons without allowing horrible instances of evil and suffering to exist in this world.
ii If possessing morally significant free will is essential to human nature, it is not clear how the redeemed can lose their morally significant freedom when they get to heaven and still be the same people they were before. iii If despite initial appearances heavenly dwellers do possess morally significant free will, then it seems that it is not impossible for God to create genuinely free creatures who always of necessity do what is right. However, they reveal that some of the central claims of his defense conflict with other important theistic doctrines. Although Plantinga claimed that his Free Will Defense offered merely possible and not necessarily actual reasons God might have for allowing evil and suffering, it may be difficult for other theists to embrace his defense if it runs contrary to what theism says is actually the case in heaven.
God, it seems, is incapable of doing anything wrong. Thus, it does not appear that, with respect to any choice of morally good and morally bad options, God is free to choose a bad option. He seems constitutionally incapable of choosing or even wanting to do what is wrong. They could never be praiseworthy. That certainly runs contrary to central doctrines of theism. If, as theists must surely maintain, God does possess morally significant freedom, then perhaps this sort of freedom does not preclude an inability to choose what is wrong. But if it is possible for God to possess morally significant freedom and for him to be unable to do wrong, then W 3 once again appears to be possible after all. Originally, Plantinga claimed that W 3 is not a logically possible world because the description of that world is logically inconsistent.
If W 3 is possible, then the complaint lodged by Flew and Mackie above that God could and therefore should have created a world full of creatures who always did what is right is not answered. There may be ways for Plantinga to resolve the difficulties sketched above, so that the Free Will Defense can be shown to be compatible with theistic doctrines about heaven and divine freedom. As it stands, however, some important challenges to the Free Will Defense remain unanswered. James R. Logical Problem of Evil The existence of evil and suffering in our world seems to pose a serious challenge to belief in the existence of a perfect God. Other Responses to the Logical Problem of Evil Problems with the Free Will Defense References and Further Reading References Further Reading 1.
Introducing the Problem Journalist and best-selling author Lee Strobel commissioned George Barna, the public-opinion pollster, to conduct a nationwide survey. McCloskey , p. Mackie and McCloskey can be understood as claiming that it is impossible for all of the following statements to be true at the same time: 1 God is omnipotent that is, all-powerful. They reason as follows: 6 If God is omnipotent, he would be able to prevent all of the evil and suffering in the world. Atheologians claim that, if we reflect upon 6 through 8 in light of the fact of evil and suffering in our world, we should be led to the following conclusions: 9 If God knows about all of the evil and suffering in the world, knows how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent it, and yet does not prevent it, he must not be perfectly good.
From 9 through 11 we can infer: 12 If evil and suffering exist, then God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good. Since evil and suffering obviously do exist, we get: 13 God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good. Logical Consistency Theists who want to rebut the logical problem of evil need to find a way to show that 1 through 4 —perhaps despite initial appearances—are consistent after all. In other words, 15 A set of statements is logically consistent if and only if it is possible for all of them to be true at the same time. In other words, 16 It is not possible for God and evil to co-exist.
Logical Consistency and the Logical Problem of Evil How might a theist go about demonstrating that 16 is false? An implicit assumption behind this part of the debate over the logical problem of evil is the following: 18 It is not morally permissible for God to allow evil and suffering to occur unless he has a morally sufficient reason for doing so. If 19 and 20 are true, then the God of orthodox theism does not exist. W 1 : a God creates persons with morally significant free will; b God does not causally determine people in every situation to choose what is right and to avoid what is wrong; and c There is evil and suffering in W 1.
W 2 : a God does not create persons with morally significant free will; b God causally determines people in every situation to choose what is right and to avoid what is wrong; and c There is no evil or suffering in W 2. W 3 : a God creates persons with morally significant free will; b God causally determines people in every situation to choose what is right and to avoid what is wrong; and c There is no evil or suffering in W 3. W 4 : a God creates persons with morally significant free will; b God does not causally determine people in every situation to choose what is right and to avoid what is wrong; and c There is no evil or suffering in W 4. Plantinga concurs.
He writes, A world containing creatures who are sometimes significantly free and freely perform more good than evil actions is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. Divine Omnipotence and the Free Will Defense Some scholars maintain that Plantinga has rejected the idea of an omnipotent God because he claims there are some things God cannot do—namely, logically impossible things. An Objection: Free Will and Natural Evil At this point, someone might raise the following objection. According to Edward Madden and Peter Hare , p. Moral evil, they continue, includes both moral wrong-doing such as lying, cheating, stealing, torturing, and murdering and character defects like greed, deceit, cruelty, wantonness, cowardice, and selfishness.
In the description of the sixth day of creation God says to Adam and Eve, I give you every seed-bearing plant on the face of the whole earth and every tree that has fruit with seed in it. Recall that the logical problem of evil can be summarized as the following claim: 16 It is not possible for God and evil to co-exist. When someone claims 40 Situation x is impossible, what is the least that you would have to prove in order to show that 40 is false? The claim 41 Situation x is possible is the contradictory of It was, after all, Mackie himself who characterized the problem of evil as one of logical inconsistency: Here it can be shown, not that religious beliefs lack rational support, but that they are positively irrational, that several parts of the essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another.
Problems with the Free Will Defense A. References and Further Reading a. References Clark, Kelly James. Return to Reason: A Critique of Enlightenment Evidentialism and a Defense of Reason and Belief in God. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. Ellot ; The Plague by Camus ; Night by Elie Weisel ; Holy the Firm and For the Time Being by Annie Dillard ; and The Book of Sorrows by Walter Wangerin offer insights for how the problem of evil may be understood. While artist Cornelia van Voorst first declares that, "artists do not think of the world in terms of good and bad, but more in terms of: "What can we make of this? The painting of Lola Lieber-Schwarz — The Murder of Matilda Lieber, Her Daughters Lola and Berta, and Berta's Children Itche Yitzhak and Marilka, January — depicts a family lying dead on the snowy ground outside a village with a Nazi and his dog walking away from the scene.
His face is not visible. The scene is cold and dead, with only the perpetrator and maybe one of his victims, a child clinging to its mother, still remaining alive. No one knows who was there to witness this event or what their relationship to these events might have been, but the art itself is a depiction of the problem of evil. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Question of reconciling the existence of evil with an all-good and -powerful God. Religious concepts. Afterlife Apophatism Cataphatism Eschatology Enlightenment Intelligent design Miracle Mysticism Religious belief Reincarnation Religious faith Scripture religious text Soul Spirit Theological veto. Ethical egoism Euthyphro dilemma Logical positivism Religious language Verificationism eschatological Problem of evil Theodicy Augustinian Irenaean Best of all possible worlds Inconsistent triad Natural evil.
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Further information: Existence of God. See also: Wild animal suffering and Predation problem. Main article: Absence of good. See also: Religious responses to the problem of evil. Main articles: Wild animal suffering and Evolutionary theodicy. Main article: Free will. Main article: Skeptical theism. Main article: Irenaean theodicy. Philosophy portal. Augustinian theodicy Atheism Cosmodicy Inconsistent triad Just-world hypothesis List of paradoxes Post-monotheism Problem of Hell Qliphoth Kabbalah Sephirah Kabbalah Theistic finitism Theodicy and the Bible Trilemma Weltschmerz. When the first living organisms die, they make room for more complex ones and begin the process of natural selection. When organisms die, new life feeds on them the sources of [natural] evil lie in attributes so valuable that we would not even consider eliminating them in order to eradicate evil.
Facing Evil. Princeton: Princeton UP. ISBN Becker; Charlotte B. Becker Encyclopedia of Ethics. The Problem of Evil. Oxford University Press. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University. Retrieved 17 January Singer, Marcus G. Singer April Cambridge University Press. doi : JSTOR S2CID NCBI Bookshelf. National Academies Press US. Retrieved 21 February The Humane Review. Retrieved 8 January American Philosophical Quarterly. The Monist. Sanford University. Retrieved 7 December The Many Faces of Evil: Historical Perspectives. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty. London: Routledge, In Bar-Am, Nimrod; Gattei, Stefano eds. Encouraging Openness: Essays for Joseph Agassi on the Occasion of His 90th Birthday.
Zalta, Edward N. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 22 February The Nature of God: An Inquiry Into Divine Attributes. Cornell University Press. Providence, Evil and the Openness of God. ProQuest The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. John Hick , for example, proposes a theodicy, while Alvin Plantinga formulates a defence. The idea of human free will often appears in a both of these strategies, but in different ways. An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices. Dallas Baptist University. Retrieved 14 April The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion Illustrated ed. Boyd , Is God to Blame? InterVarsity Press , ISBN , pp. A Brief Guide to Beliefs: Ideas, Theologies, Mysteries, and Movements.
Westminster John Knox Press. Raging with Compassion: Pastoral Responses to the Problem of Evil. Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy. Princeton University Press. Socialization and Civil Society. According to Mark Joseph Larrimore, , The Problem of Evil , pp. According to Reinhold F. Glei , it is settled that the argument of theodicy is from an academical source which is not only not epicurean, but even anti-epicurean. Reinhold F. Glei, Et invidus et inbecillus. Das angebliche Epikurfragment bei Laktanz, De ira dei 13, 20—21 , in: Vigiliae Christianae 42 , pp. In McBrayer, Justin P. The Blackwell Companion to The Problem of Evil. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell.
Introducing Philosophy of Religion. Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil. Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering. Almeida Freedom, God, and Worlds. Barlow, Nora ed. The Autobiography of Charles Darwin — With the original omissions restored. Edited and with appendix and notes by his granddaughter Nora Barlow. London: Collins. Retrieved 9 May Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams ed. Rowe William L. Rowe on Philosophy of Religion: Selected Writings. Early Modern Philosophy of Religion: The History of Western Philosophy of Religion. An essay on the principle of population. Oxford World's Classics reprint. The Religion of Plato 2, reprint ed.
The Problem of Evil in the Western Tradition. Liturgical Press. Jeffery Evil and International Relations: Human Suffering in an Age of Terror. Palgrave Macmillan. Knowledge JOURNAL OF HUMAN SCIENCES. Theophrastus' Characters: A New Introduction. van Raalte, M. Theophrastus Metaphysics: With Introduction, Translation and Commentary. Erickson, Christian Theology, Second Edition, Baker Academic, , pp. Christian Science. University of California Press. Erickson Christian Theology. Baker Academic. Hume Studies. Stephen Palmquist explains why Kant refuses to solve the problem of evil in "Faith in the Face of Evil", Appendix VI of Kant's Critical Religion Aldershot: Ashgate, Replying to the anti-god challenge: A god without moral character acts well.
Religious Studies, 48 1 , 35— Philosophy Compass. Wylie Online Library. The Secular Web. Retrieved 10 April edu : 6. CiteSeerX Retrieved 1 February Tomberlin, H. Alvin Plantinga "Self Profile". Springer Netherlands. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Project Gutenberg. Retrieved 12 January O'Leary Arguing the Apocalypse. Graduate Theological Union. The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, and the Problem of Evil. Zygon Journal of Religion and Science. God, Evolution, and Animal Suffering: Theodicy without a Fall.
Murphy, Nancey C. Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural Evil : — Theology and Science. Ayala, Francisco J. Ayala Darwin's Gift to Science and Religion illustrated, reprint ed. National Academies Press. Crossroad Publishing Company. Evil and Evolution: A Theodicy. Wipf and Stock Publishers. The Atrocity Paradigm A Theory of Evil. Doing Without Adam and Eve Sociobiology and Original Sin. Fortress Press. Belief in God in an Age of Science. New Haven, CT: Yale Nota Bene. and also See esp. Observing you can catch some disease by the operation of natural processes gives me the power either to use those processes to give that disease to other people, or through negligence to allow others to catch it, or to take measures to prevent others from catching the disease.
The actions which natural evil makes possible are ones which allow us to perform at our best and interact with our fellows at the deepest level" Oxford: Oxford University Press, — Boyd, Is God to Blame? InterVarsity Press, ISBN , pp. Philosophy for AS: Epistemology and Philosophy of Religion. God, freedom, and evil. Eerdmans Publishing Company. Mackie, J. Mackie The Nature of Necessity. Clarendon Press. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. ISSN Philosophical Perspectives. The Miracle of Theism Arguments for and Against the Existence of God. Since this defense is formally [that is, logically] possible, and its principle involves no real abandonment of our ordinary view of the opposition between good and evil, we can concede that the problem of evil does not, after all, show that the central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another.
But whether this offers a real solution of the problem is another question. Arguing About Gods. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 21 September Lewis writes: "We can, perhaps, conceive of a world in which God corrected the results of this abuse of free will by His creatures at every moment: so that a wooden beam became soft as grass when it was used as a weapon, and the air refused to obey me if I attempted to set up in it the sound waves that carry lies or insults. But such a world would be one in which wrong actions were impossible, and in which, therefore, freedom of the will would be void; nay, if the principle were carried out to its logical conclusion, evil thoughts would be impossible, for the cerebral matter which we use in thinking would refuse its task when we attempted to frame them.
Lewis The Problem of Pain HarperCollins, pp. Accessed 10 July God, Freedom, and Evil. Evil Revisited: Responses and Reconsiderations. State University of New York Press. In a sense, it exists in a way completely removed by God because it is a concept of humanity alone. We decide what is evil, and this is often a subject of debate. For example, there are people who torture and kill others, and who are identified as having extreme brain disorders. The actions certainly conform to the most horrific ideas of evil, but it is questionable whether this applies, and because these people are under biological influences dictating the behavior. Even so, many still insist that evil is present in such cases, the causes notwithstanding.
There can be no real justification for the suffering of such victims, but there is as well a purpose to be seen. In plain terms, evil tends to create the need in others to address it and generate some form of good. People will care for victims of evil as much as they can, and this brings out the better nature of human beings. Then, the structures of cultures and societies very much go to laws and norms that express good and defy, and prevent, evil. People universally come together to address evil behaviors and make efforts to limit any opportunity for evil to exist, from laws exacting punishment for crimes to support organizations for many kinds of victims of injustice or cruelty.
Goodness is more than a concept; it is in fact a reaction very often, and a practical effort to redress evil. As noted, light can only be known because of darkness, and the same may be said of evil. This view in place, there is no issue with reconciling a benevolent God with it. It is, as the phrase goes, part of the larger reality understood fully only by God. There is also another consideration regarding the permitting of evil by an otherwise caring God. This goes to the inability of human beings to actually understand the nature of God, and their usual way of attaching expectations to God that do not apply. People historically and today ask the same question: why does God let evil happen, when He is all-powerful and can remove all evil forever? One answer lies in the discussion above, in terms of evil as necessary to create goodness.
The other, however, is that God is not a divine power who directly intervenes in human affairs and behavior. It seems that many perceive God as a kind of employer, and one who should involve himself in the concerns and matters of all human beings. The reality of the world, nonetheless, offers no evidence of any such involvement, and simply because what humanity does occurs apart from God and divine influence. Then, and importantly, it is an enormous element of Scripture that God does not directly act in human affairs, and the key to this is the affirming of human beings as exercising their own will.
God does not permit evil, then. Rather, he permits mankind to do what it will, and suffer the consequences when it acts in evil ways. Evil is a source of misery to many, as has been true since the earliest days of humanity. As there is widespread belief in God, there then arises the long ongoing question of how evil can be in a world ordered by a benevolent God. There is no one answer, but there are explanations. With animals, the evil of pain prompts behaviors that go to survival. Regarding gratuitous evil to animals and to people, more is necessary, and it is seen that good exists only because evil must be addressed. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, God and evil are reconciled because evil itself is both a human concept and the force created by humans, acting with the wills given to them by God.
He permits evil, then, as He permits the universe itself to exist. Ultimately, and in my estimation, evil is only a natural force among others enabled by God. It is a force that actually creates opportunities for good, and a behavior that is necessary for humans and animals to exercise their own instincts and wills as God wishes them to. Keller, James A. Problems of Evil and the Power of God. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, Problems from Philosophy, 3 rd Ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Humanities, Protecting Vulnerable Employees, Assessment Example.
Ethics and Values Between for Profit and Not for Profit Organizations, Research Paper Example. Need a professionally written Custom Essay? Right now, you can get a professionally written essay in any discipline with a. We're now sending you a link to download your e-book, please check your e-mail. Thank you! You can receive the notifications now. It's pleasure to stay in touch!
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